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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will investigate a subset of employment discrimination
plaintiffs-those I call the "class of one." This "class of one"' includes
plaintiffs who hold a unique position at a small office or are the only
employees who have a specific set of job characteristics 2 within a larger
office. An illustrative example is an office with six departments and
seventy employees, where Janet works in the Marketing Department.3 The
Marketing Department is comprised of five employees: one regional vice
president, two senior account managers, one staff account manager (Janet),
and one administrative assistant.
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2001, Columbia
College, Columbia University. I would like to thank Stephanie Hendricks and Joanne
Skerrett for their thoughtful feedback and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School Journal of Business and Employment Law for their skillful editing. I am also deeply
grateful to Yvonne Beckles for her enduring faith.
1. Traditionally, "class of one" refers to the ability of an individual to bring forth an
equal protection claim. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the Supreme Court held that the
"Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a 'class of one' where
the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group." 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The
Court further held that "the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal
protection analysis." Id. at 564 n.*.
2. Job characteristics include, for example, job title, job description, salary, and
supervisor (the individual to whom the employee reports).
3. This example is solely for illustrative purposes. See Figure: Marketing Department
Organizational Chart, infra.
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FIGURE: MARKETING DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
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Each position has a different salary and none of the five employees
reports to the same supervisor (or set of supervisors).4 As a staff account
manager, Janet reports to one of the senior account managers. In this
example, Janet and others in the Marketing Department are within a "class
of one" because no one is "similarly situated." Each of the five employees
has a unique set of job characteristics that no one else in the Marketing
Department shares. For example, the two account managers are not
"similarly situated" because they do not share the same supervisor. As will
be discussed, courts differ in their articulation of the "similarly situated"
standard, but some of the factors courts generally look to in assessing
whether individuals are similarly situated include whether individuals have
the same supervisor, responsibilities, and conduct.5
4. One senior account manager reports solely to the regional vice president. The
second account manager reports to both the regional vice president and the senior vice
president who oversees all departments.
5. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. Rnv. 831, 863-64 (2002) ("There are three
main distinctions courts draw in deciding that the plaintiff and a comparator are not
similarly situated: (1) the fact that the plaintiff and comparator had different supervisors;
(2) the fact that the two employees had different responsibilities or job titles; and (3) the fact
that they were punished for different conduct.").
CLASS OF ONE
It is already difficult to prove employment discrimination,6 and
without one of the most common tools, the use of a similarly situated
comparator,7 those in the "class of one" have limited methods with which
to prove an employment discrimination claim.
This Comment investigates whether the "class of one" is at a severe
disadvantage with respect to proving employment discrimination claims.
Part II gives an overview of employment discrimination claims available to
plaintiffs under Title VII. Part III reviews the predominant analysis used
for Title VII discrimination cases involving indirect evidence. Part IV
examines how one of those means of indirect evidence, the use of the
similarly situated standard in identifying comparators, is interpreted across
the circuit courts of appeal. Part V discusses a dramatic story involving
two former Hewlett-Packard (HP) executives who were arguably members
of the "class of one." Their stories highlight additional areas of needed
reform for the "class of one." Part VI then proposes changes aimed at
ameliorating the position of the "class of one." Finally, Part VII concludes
that while the "class of one" is in a precarious position, given certain
changes to the ways courts approach the "similarly situated" standard, all
may not be lost for the "class of one."
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SOME EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
Three common types of employment discrimination claims under Title
VII8 are: disparate treatment, disparate impact and hostile work
6. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of direct evidence
and the subtlety of discrimination).
7. See generally infra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the "similarly
situated" standard in Title VII cases).
8. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004) [hereinafter Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
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environment. 9  Disparate treatment, sometimes called discriminatory
treatment or intentional discrimination,
is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most
obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VIIVO
Disparate impact involves a facially neutral policy that has a discriminatory
effect on a protected class."' A hostile work environment exists when work
conditions create an atmosphere of discriminatory animus against members
of a protected class.' 2
9. See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv.
623, 654-655 (2005) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Enforcement efforts under the statute have centered primarily on three theories of
discrimination: disparate treatment theory, which holds employers liable for intentionally
discriminatory, identifiable employment actions taken by particular wrongdoers and for
systemic practices or policies of intentional exclusion; disparate impact theory, which holds
employers liable for the use of employment practices that have an adverse effect on
members of particular groups and are not justified by business necessity; and hostile work
environment theory, which protects employees against harassing conduct that rises to the
level of a hostile environment."); Lisa Marshall, The Character of Discrimination Law: The
Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063,
1069 (2005) (discussing the use of propensity evidence in employment discrimination
cases).
10. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Cf
Marshall, supra note 9, at 1069 n.21 ("The systemic disparate treatment model ... differs
from the individual disparate treatment model, given its focus on a 'pattern or practice' of
intentional discrimination rather than on discrete events.").
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("Under the [Civil Rights] Act
[of 1964], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."). See also Marshall, supra note 9, at 1069 n.21 ("[Tlhe disparate
impact model governs a fundamentally different form of discrimination suit, insofar as it
dispenses with the requirement to prove discriminatory intent in forbidding an employer
from acting to 'limit, segregate, or classify' employees 'in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee' because of, e.g., his race." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(2000))).
12. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing the existence of
"working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers .... ). See also Marshall,
supra note 9, at 1069 n.21 ("A suit alleging a hostile work environment ... requires the
plaintiff to show harassing behavior to be 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of . . . employment,' without necessarily showing an employer's intention to
make it so." (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004))).
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A. Disparate Treatment and the "Class of One"
This Comment focuses on disparate treatment with respect to the
"class of one" employee. An individual can prove discriminatory treatment
by direct or indirect evidence. 13 Direct evidence of discrimination is rare, 4
especially given the heavy burden placed on plaintiffs to submit "direct
evidence [showing] that decisionmakers placed substantial negative
reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision."' 5
Therefore, evidence must illustrate the decisionmaker's heavy reliance on
illegitimate reasons in reaching his decision. For example, in a Fifth
Circuit case, an African American male was rejected for a position as a
poker dealer because "these good old white boys don't want black people
touching their cards."' 6  The Court determined that this statement in
addition to the use of the n-word on several occasions by a person with
13. See ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 69 (7th ed. 2004) ("[A] plaintiff may prove a
claim of unlawful employment discrimination, including the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination, by direct or circumstantial evidence."); THOMAS R. HAGGARD,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 64-68 (2001) (discussing direct and indirect
evidence of discrimination).
14. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999),
abrogated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) on other grounds,
("[Djiscrimination tends more and more to operate in subtle ways, [therefore] direct
evidence is relatively rare[.]"); Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("[T]he court must be alert to the fact that '[e]mployers are rarely so cooperative
as to include a notation in the personnel file' .... " (quoting Thornbrough v. Columbus &
Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985))); Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859
F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988) (In reality "direct evidence of discrimination is difficult to
find precisely because its practitioners deliberately try to hide it."); see also Susan K.
Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination if She
Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances: The Need for Broad Workforce and Time
Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 159, 159 (1996) (Circumstantial evidence "is
the most common way by which an employer's discrimination is proved"); cf Slack v.
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (not followed on other grounds) (ruling that
remarks like "Colored people should stay in their places" and "Colored people are hired to
clean because they clean better" are direct evidence of discrimination).
15. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Some federal courts have had difficulty defining "direct" evidence given
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, which stated that direct
evidence must show "that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision[.]"
Id. at 276. See also Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581-82 (identifying three classes of direct
evidence that arose across the circuits as a result of O'Connor's "trenchant, universally
accepted example of what is not direct evidence: stray remarks, such as 'statements by
decisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself.'
Since then, however, jurists have struggled in attempting to define the term affirmatively.
This operose task not only has divided the courts of appeals but also has created a
patchwork of intra-circuit conflicts." (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277) (internal
citations omitted and emphasis added)).
16. Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group, 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005).
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decision-making power constituted direct evidence of discrimination. 7
Often, plaintiffs do not have access to this kind of direct evidence and
usually have to rely on circumstantial evidence. As a result, employment
discrimination cases using indirect evidence are extremely fact-sensitive.
A common, if not the most common, way for a plaintiff to prove
discriminatory treatment is to show that a similarly situated individual,
outside the protected class, was treated differently.
18 Returning to Janet
and her co-workers in the Marketing Department,
9 if Janet believed that
she was discriminated against, and she did not have direct evidence, it
would be nearly impossible for her to prove her case since there are no
other employees similarly situated to her position.
The Second Circuit determined that "cases occasionally arise where a
plaintiff cannot show disparate treatment . . . because there are no
employees similarly situated to the plaintiff."
2 °  While there are no
empirical studies to show how occasional these cases are, one could argue
that the only reason such cases would be occasional is because "class of
one" cases usually do not advance to trial, let alone an appellate court.
Discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence are already difficult
to prove." Therefore, when you add the lack of a similarly situated
comparator, it is clear that those in the "class of one" are at an even greater
disadvantage than "typical" plaintiffs (those not in the "class of one").
To gain a better understanding of what is required to prove an
individual disparate treatment claim, an understanding of the foundational
case law is required.
17. Id. at 993 (finding that decisionmakers "used race as a factor in employment
decisions....").
18. See HAGGARD, supra note 13, at 67 ("An easy and obvious way for a plaintiff to
prove that unfavorable treatment was because of a protected characteristic is by reference to
a similarly situated person, albeit of a different race, color, sex, national origin, or
religion."); see, e.g., Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1998) (A
"common way to raise an inference [of discrimination] is to prove disparate treatment by
showing that [plaintiff] was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees ... 
(internal quotations omitted).
19. See supra Part I (introducing a prototype of "class of one" for illustrative purposes).
20. Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added).
21. See, e.g., BELTON ET AL., supra note 13, at 69 ("Proving intentional discrimination
can be difficult in disparate treatment cases, particularly in those cases in which a plaintiff
must rely solely upon circumstantial evidence.").
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ANALYSIS
A. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,22 the Supreme Court first
articulated the burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII discrimination
cases. McDonnell Douglas involved a black civil rights activist, Percy
Green, who believed his recent layoff from his mechanic and laboratory
technician position was racially motivated. In response to his dismissal,
Green commenced a series of protests that involved disruptive and illegal
activity against his employer, McDonnell Douglas. 3 As a black man,
Green was within the protected class specified in Title VII.2 4 McDonnell
Douglas articulated a three stage analysis to balance employment
discrimination evidence.25  The analysis begins with the burden on the
plaintiff who must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 6
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas is not the only paradigm under which
employment discrimination cases are analyzed. Discrimination cases are also analyzed
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Typically, Price Waterhouse has
been used to analyze direct evidence discrimination cases but the Supreme Court's ruling in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) held that a case may be analyzed under
Price Waterhouse even in the absence of direct evidence because nothing in the 1991
Amendments to Title VII requires direct evidence. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98-99. After
the Desert Palace ruling, several commentators have predicted the demise of the McDonnell
Douglas framework; however, it endures. Compare William R. Corbett, McDonnell
Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 203 (2003)
(discussing the confusion in determining which analysis to use in a particular employment
discrimination case), and Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi est Mort; Vive le* Roi! ": An Essay
on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case
After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72
(2003) (describing McDonnell Douglas as "dead as a doornail"), with Steven J. Kaminshine,
Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination: The Need for a Restatement, Not a
Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7 (2005) (concluding that "McDonnell Douglas is not
dead, just wounded, that it can and should coexist with its mixed-motive sibling [Price
Waterhouse], and that with certain adjustments we can and should maintain a distinction
between pretext and mixed-motive claims").
23. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973) ("[Green] and other
members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally stalled their cars on the main roads
leading to petitioner's plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at the time of the
morning shift change.").
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....").
25. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26. Id.
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the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.27
If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the
defendant who must produce evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the employee's rejection.28 Upon satisfaction of the defendant's
burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, whereby she is given an
opportunity to rebut those legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and argue
that they are mere pretext. 29 Evidence of such pretext may include showing
that a similarly situated individual, outside the protected class, was treated
more favorably.3"
B. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
The McDonnell Douglas analysis was further developed in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,3' which clarified the second
stage of the analysis. In Burdine, a former female employee brought a
discrimination suit against her employer alleging that she was denied a
promotion because of her sex.32 As a female, Burdine was protected under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 33 In Burdine, the Supreme Court
states that the prima facie burden "is not onerous.... The prima facie case
serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most
27. Id.
28. Id. at 802-04.
29. Id. at 805 ("[R]espondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.").
30. See id. ("Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white
employees involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in'
were nevertheless retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to rehire one who
was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike
to members of all races."). Plaintiff may assert other evidence to show pretext. Such
evidence may include:
[Flacts as to the petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior term of
employment; petitioner's reaction, if any, to respondent's legitimate civil rights
activities; and petitioner's general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment. On the latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment policy
and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to
rehire respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination
against blacks.
Id. at 804-05. Each circuit varies on how they determine who is similarly situated. See
infra Part IV. For example, the Second Circuit uses a vague standard that requires those
who are similarly situated to be so in "all material respects" but it does not specify any
particular respects. Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997).
31. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
CLASS OF ONE
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. 34 Further,
and more importantly, the defendant's burden to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason "need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons, but it is sufficient if the defendant's
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the company]
discriminated against the plaintiff."35 Therefore, the defendant's burden is
one of production not of persuasion.36 The burden of persuasion rests with
the plaintiff who may succeed "either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence., 37 Burdine also emphasized that "McDonnell Douglas teaches
that it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees
were not treated equally[,]" 3t not the defendant's.
C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,39 a correctional officer/shift
commander alleged that his demotion and ultimate discharge were due to
his race, in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court held, in a five to four
opinion, that proving the falsity of an employer's explanation was not
enough to sustain a plaintiffs discrimination claim.40  Defendant's
production burden does not involve a "credibility assessment," and this
assessment occurs after production.4' Therefore, the ultimate burden of
persuasion rests with the plaintiff.
42
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion
of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection
of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination .... But...
[it does not] compel[] judgment for the plaintiff ....
34. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
35. Id. at 248 (internal citation omitted).
36. See id. at 254 ("The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or
someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need
not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.").
37. Id. at 256.
38. Id. at 258 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
39. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 509.
42. Id. at 511.
43. Id. at 511 (internal citation omitted). The Court goes on to say that "nothing in law
would permit us to substitute for the required finding that the employer's action was the
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This ruling confronted the
pretext-plus/pretext-only controversy that had divided the lower
courts. Under the pretext-only view, a plaintiff who was able to
prove that the employer's explanation was a pretext was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.... Under the pretext-plus view, a
finding of pretext alone was insufficient; the plaintiff needed
additional evidence to show that the employer's proffered reason
was a pretext for discrimination .... The Court agreed that Title
VII required proof that the employer's false explanation was a
pretext for discrimination, but that the fact finder could properly
draw that inference from the pretext itself.
44
Needless to say, the lower courts were still confused and the Supreme
Court revisited the issue in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc. 45
D. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
Reeves held that a prima facie case, when combined with sufficient
evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject an employer's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons, may be sufficient to sustain a claim of
intentional discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).46 Specifically, plaintiff Reeves made a substantial showing
that the defendant's explanation for his dismissal, poor record keeping, was
false. 47 The Court cautioned that it was not a given that such a showing by
the plaintiff would always be sufficient.48
E. Summary
An individual alleging a discrimination claim and using indirect
evidence must 49 utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the
employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15. Therefore, "[i]t is
not enough . . .to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's
explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. at 519.
44. Kaminshine, supra note 22, at 13.
45. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
46. Id. at 147 ("[I]t is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation.").
47. Id.
48. Id. at 148 ("For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the
employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.").
49. Cf supra note 22 (discussing the use of the Price Waterhouse analysis for indirect
evidence discrimination cases).
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Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. ° After establishing a prima facie case, the defendant then
produces legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his or her actions. 1
This evidence need not persuade the court that the defendant was motivated
by the specified reasons. Upon production, plaintiff must prove that the
specified reasons were merely a pretext for the defendant's actions. 2
While establishment of a prima facie case and evidence of pretext will
generally allow the plaintiffs case to reach the factfinder, "there will be
instances where . . . no rational factfinder could conclude that
discrimination had occurred."53
IV. SIMILARLY SITUATED STANDARD ACROSS THE CIRCUITS
A common method used by plaintiffs to satisfy the prima facie case
and to prove pretext in the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to show that the
defendant treated others who are similarly situated to the plaintiff, but who
are not within the protected class, more favorably. 4 While the "similarly
situated" standard originated in McDonnell Douglas55 and was further
refined in Burdine,56 it is by no means uniformly defined across the circuit
courts of appeal and is hardly a "standard" in the strict sense. 7
50. See supra Part III.A.
51. See supra Part III.A.
52. See supra Part III.B.
53. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134-35 (2000).
54. See HAGGARD, supra note 13, at 67 (noting that a comparator may be considered at
the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); see also Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of
Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that a common way to raise an inference of
discrimination is by showing that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than someone
similarly situated who was not in the protected class); 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination
§ 2507 (2002) ("This may be accomplished by a showing that similarly situated employees
or applicants, who are not members of the plaintiff's protected group, were treated more
favorably under comparable circumstances, or by a showing that the employer deviated
from its established rules or procedures in dealing with the plaintiff." (internal citations
omitted)); Grebeldinger, supra note 14, at 159 (stating that circumstantial evidence is the
most common way to prove employer discrimination).
55. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) ("Especially
relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts ... of
comparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained or rehired .... In short ... [Plaintiff]
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision.").
56. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981).
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Watts v. City of Norman, 536 U.S. 976 (2002)
(No. 011299), 2002 WL 32134671 [hereinafter Watts Petition] ("The First, Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have articulated different standards for
determining whether a given plaintiff is 'similarly situated' to his suggested comparable
employee(s).").
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The First Circuit utilizes a "prudent person" standard. 8 "The test is
whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think
them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated."'5 9
Furthermore, a "claim of disparate treatment based on comparable evidence
must rest on proof that the proposed analogue is similarly situated in
material respects."6
In the Second Circuit, the issue of determining whether a coworker is
similarly situated to the plaintiff is generally a question of fact for the
jury.6" The fact finder must determine if the coworker is similarly situated
in "all material respects. 62
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits utilize a "nearly identical" standard.63
In Okoye v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center, the court
stated that in order "to establish disparate treatment a plaintiff must show
that the employer gave preferential treatment to another employee under
nearly identical circumstances; that is, that the misconduct for which the
plaintiff was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by other
employees." 64 The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that "[t]he comparator must
58. Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 76 (1st Cir. 2004); Conward v. Cambridge
Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889
F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (not followed on other grounds).
59. Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 19.
60. Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1996).
61. See, e.g., Roa v. Mineta, 51 F. App'x 896, 899 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether two
individuals are indeed similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury .... ");
Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming that the question
of whether two employees are similarly situated should remain with the jury); Hargett v.
Nat'l Westminster Bank, USA, 78 F.3d 836, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (contending that the jury
must decide whether the employees were similarly situated).
62. Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second
Circuit does not have a strict set of factors with which to determine who is similarly situated
in "all material respects" but it has generally used factors like shared supervisor, shared
disciplinary standards, and similar duties as a means to determine whether individuals are
similarly situated. See, e.g., McDowell v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 04-2909, 2007 WL
2816194, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007) ("There is no specific set of criteria used to
determine whether employees' conduct is comparable .... Rather, the determination of
whether two employees are similarly situated in all material respects is based on (1) whether
the plaintiff and [his comparators] were subject to the same workplace standards and (2)
whether the conduct for which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable
seriousness.") (internal citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., Dileo v. Ashcroft, 201 F. App'x 190 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the "nearly
identical" standard and citing Okoye v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center,
245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001)); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
1999) ("[T]he quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be nearly
identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions .... ").
64. Okoye, 245 F.3d at 514 (some internal punctuation omitted and citation references
omitted).
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be 'nearly identical' to the plaintiff to prevent courts from second-guessing
a reasonable decision by the employer.,
65
The Sixth Circuit's test, as articulated in Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital,
66
requires that comparators be substantially similar in all respects. 67  The
Tenth Circuit employs a similar standard, requiring the plaintiff to show
that the "comparables are similarly-situated in all respects.,68  Although
"[c]omparable employees must be similarly situated in all respects relevant
to the employer's decision ... they need not be identically situated. 69
In the Seventh Circuit, the fourth element of a prima facie case
requires that a "similarly situated employee outside the protected class was
treated more favorably by the employer."70 On the other hand, the Eighth
Circuit test, as articulated by Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., determines
that "[e]mployees are similarly situated when they are involved in or
accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways.'
The confusion regarding which standard to apply has prompted
various state supreme courts and the District of Columbia Circuit to look to
the federal system for "nonbinding guidance regarding the standard to
apply when determining what constitutes 'similarly situated' employees in
employment discrimination cases based on state law."72 Various parties
65. Dickinson v. Springhill Hosps., Inc., 187 F. App'x 937, 939 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (citing
Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004)) (some internal
punctuation omitted).
66. 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
67. Id. ("[Tihe 'comparables' [must be] ... similarly situated in all respects.... [They]
must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have
engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it."). Cf Watts
Petition, supra note 57, at 16 ("The Sixth Circuit has backed away from the Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp. 's rigid standard of similarly situated in all respects, and currently uses the
similarly situated in all relevant respects standard. As a result, there is an intracircuit split
.... .(internal citation omitted)); David L. Hudson, Will the Sixth Circuit Stick to One
Standard with Respect to 'Similarly Situated' Employees?, 37 TENN. BAR J. 25, 30 (2001)
("The lack of consistency in the Sixth Circuit with respect to comparables is disturbing for
employment law practitioners on both sides.").
68. See Magruder v. Runyon, 844 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Kan. 1994), aff'd, 544 F.3d
787 (10th Cir. 1995) (some internal punctuation omitted) ("[T]o be deemed 'similarly-
situated,' the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must
have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have
engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.").
69. Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 889, 894 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal punctuation omitted).
70. Watts Petition, supra note 57, at 16 (citing Gordon v. United Airlines, 246 F.3d
878, 886 (7th Cir. 2001)).
71. 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Watts Petition, supra note 57, at 16 (citing Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc'y,
936 P.2d 643, 648-51 (Haw. 1997) (adopting "all relevant aspects" standard); Hollins v.
Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d 563, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying the "nearly
identical" standard); Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 1303, 1310
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have also petitioned the Supreme Court to be heard on the question of
clarifying the "similarly situated" standard. 3 Although the Supreme Court
did not grant certiorari in these cases, their existence indicates a growing
problem.
The differing standards across the circuits cause a great deal of
uncertainty in discrimination cases generally,74 and are arguably a death
knell in "class of one" cases specifically. To get a better sense of the "class
of one" problem, an example will prove helpful.
V. THE HEWLETT-PACKARD EXECUTIVES: A CONNECTION REVEALED?
A particularly interesting example of potential "class of one"
individuals is that of former Hewlett-Packard (HP) executives Carleton S.
Fiorina ("Carly Fiorina") and Patricia Dunn.75
A. Carly Fiorina
Carly Fiorina served as HP's President and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) from 1999 through 2005 and as Chairman of the Board from 2000
through 2005.76 Fiorina was dismissed in early 2005 by the HP board when
they could no longer agree on the future of HP (subsequent to a merger
(Mass. 1997) (describing the use of the "all relevant aspects" standard in the pretext stage);
Kroh v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 36, 37-39 (Ohio 2001) (rejecting Mitchell v.
Toledo Hospital's "in all respects" approach and adopting the "all of the relevant aspects"
standard).
73. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Fulton County v. Lambert, 536 U.S.
906 (2002) (No. 011568), 2002 WL 32135248 (asking "[w]hether certiorari should be
granted to resolve a conflict among the United States Courts of Appeal as to the standard for
proper comparators in a disparate discipline employment discrimination case"); Watts
Petition, supra note 57, at i (asking "[i]s the standard for determining whether an
employment discrimination plaintiff is 'similarly situated' to his comparable(s) under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56 the same as the standard for determining whether he is 'similarly situated' to
his comparable(s) at trial" and whether "the 'similarly situated' test is the same in the prima
facie case and pretext stages of cases governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green").
74. Although this comment focuses on Title VII, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis is also used in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and other employment
discrimination cases. See generally Horvat v. Forbes Reg'l Hosp., 184 F. App'x 216 (3d
Cir. 2006) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADEA claim); Dyrek v.
Garvey, 334 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying McDonnell Douglas to an ADA claim);
McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell Douglas to a §
1981 claim).
75. Although there is no overt evidence, the circumstances surrounding these two
former HP chairmen illustrate both the difficulty involved in proving discrimination claims
and the difficulty of initially identifying the problem.
76. Former Executive Bios: Carleton S. Fiorina,
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/execteamfbios/fiorina.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
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with another computer company, Compaq)." At the time, the reasons for
her dismissal were described as including both her failure "to produce the
kind of profits she had promised" and a collision of her management style
with the egalitarian "corporate culture where workers were treated not so
much as employees but as family . . . ,"8 While HP denied that a culture
clash7 9 or gender was to blame for Fiorina's dismissal, 80 Fiorina and others
looked back on her removal,8' over a year and a half later, with new eyes.
This review was especially interesting given the almost contemporaneous
dismissal of HP executive Patricia Dunn.
While antidiscrimination law can be a powerful protection for those
who suffer adverse employment actions, "[t]he [current] model of legal
protection assumes that those who have suffered harms will recognize their
injuries and invoke the protective measures of law., 82 Invocation of these
rights is far from proving a case based on these rights. Hypothetically, if
Fiorina suspected discrimination at the time of her dismissal, under the
current system, which heavily relies on the "similarly situated" standard, it
is unlikely that she would have been able to prove it. However, after a
second female HP executive, Patricia Dunn, was dismissed by the same HP
board, the press was drawing parallels between the two cases, and perhaps
Fiorina was herself.
83
77. Id.; Fiorina Comments on Public Firing, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/main2O69703-page2.shtml.
78. Gary Rivlin & John Markoff, Tossing Out a Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2005, at C1.
79. Fiorina discusses the dysfunction of the HP Board in her memoir. See generally
CARLY FIORINA, TOUGH CHOICES: A MEMOIR 280-95 (2006) (discussing the dysfunction of
the HP Board).
80. See Rivlin & Markoff, supra note 78, at C1 (noting that an HP interim chief
executive denied that a culture clash played a role in Fiorina's departure); see also infra note
100 (quoting Tom Perkins who denied that Fiorina's gender was a problem).
81. See generally FIORINA, supra note 79 (discussing her tenure at HP); Del Jones,
"Former HP Chief Fiorina Takes a Look Back," USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2006, at 5B,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2006-10-15-fiorina-
advicex.htm?tab 1-4 (noting that Fiorina believes that her firing had nothing to do with her
performance).
82. Kristin Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of
Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421, 422 (1987). "Since most antidiscrimination laws rely
primarily on victims to identify violations, report them to public authorities, and participate
in enforcement proceedings, these laws tacitly assume that such behavior is reasonably
unproblematic." Id.
83. See, e.g., Fiorina Comments on Public Firing, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/main2069703.shtml ("Last
February, Carly was fired-abruptly and very publicly-with striking parallels with what
happened to Pattie Dunn.").
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B. Patricia Dunn
Patricia Dunn served as HP Chairman from February 2005 until
September 2006, when she resigned due to a controversy regarding efforts
to investigate board-level leaks during, and prior to, her tenure at HP.
84 A
month after her resignation, Dunn was criminally charged with four felony
counts: fraudulent use of wire, radio or television transmissions; taking,
copying, and using computer data without authorization; identity theft; and
conspiracy.85 "Dunn says a majority of the board asked her to initiate a
leak inquiry, 86 when private HP business ended up in the media.
87 In a 60
Minutes interview in October 2006,8 Dunn described the circumstances
surrounding the backlash over the board leaks as an effort by former HP
director, and then board member, Thomas Perkins to oust her and destroy
her reputation.89 When the investigation revealed the source of the leaks as
prominent board member, Jay Keyworth, Perkins allegedly wanted Dunn to
keep it quiet.9° When Dunn refused, Keyworth was asked to resign and
Perkins gave his own resignation "in a huff' and stormed out of an HP
board meeting. 9' Dunn says that Perkins
turned to me sitting nearby and pointed at me and said, "You
betrayed me." He said that several times. "You betrayed me,
Pattie. You said that we would handle this off-line and a good
man is being ruined as a result." . . . So he drove off and ended
up going onto his mega yacht in the Mediterranean. And I
suspect he thought over the ensuing days that it was just
unacceptable that he was off the board, Jay was going to be off
the board, and I was still chairman .... It was a disinformation, a
classic disinformation campaign . . . . He set the mindset for
basically everything that's believed about this right now.
92
84. James B. Stewart, The Kona Files: How an Obsession with Leaks Brought Scandal
to Hewlett-Packard, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007, at 152.
85. Patricia Dunn: I Am Innocent, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/main2069430.shtml.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. ("[T]hey were best friends .... They were allies on the board. And I think he
[Perkins] thought it was a possibility that the board would say the leaker should resign. He
just didn't want that outcome" said Dunn about Perkins' reaction (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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C. Connection?
While Dunn's criminal case was pending,93 some commentators drew
parallels with Carly Fiorina: "both women were forced out of HP and are
lashing out at some members of the male-dominated board." 94 At one
point in early 2005, during Fiorina's tenure, members of the HP board
approached Fiorina to restructure the company in a way that would strip
her of some of her responsibilities. 95 That plan was ultimately leaked to the
Wall Street Journal. A leak investigation at that time did not reveal the
Wall Street Journal source, although Perkins later admitted that he was a
second source to that story. In a 60 Minutes interview, over a year and a
half later, Fiorina said that she intended to clear the air and move forward
after the Wall Street Journal leak, but at the subsequent board meeting, she
was fired, and Dunn was elected chairman of the board.96 Fiorina described
the dismissal as "heartless" and "disrespectful." 97 As with Dunn, the key
board members at the center of Fiorina's final months at HP were Tom
Perkins and Jay Keyworth.
In 2005, Fiorina's dismissal was viewed in a more benign98 light than
it would later be viewed after Dunn's departure, which revealed some
common threads between the two episodes. Both Fiorina and Dunn were in
a "class of one," holding unique positions where there were no viable
comparators while each worked at HP. 99 As two women who were
unwilling to move lock-step with the board on all issues, Fiorina and
93. Charges against Patricia Dunn were ultimately dismissed. Matt Richtel, Charges
Dismissed in Hewlett-Packard Spying Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C1.
94. Fiorina Comments on Public Firing, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/1 0/05/60minutes/main2069703.shtml.
95. Id.; see generally FIORINA, supra note 79 (discussing Fiorina's tenure at HP).
96. Fiorina Comments on Public Firing, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/main2069703.shtm.. Fiorina's
interview aired the same night as Dunn's interview. Id.
97. Id. ("Maybe they took great pleasure in seeing me beat up publicly for weeks and
weeks and weeks.")
98. Although there were some who considered that Fiorina's gender had something to
do with her dismissal, it was ultimately rejected and commentators looked to other reasons
for her departure. See, e.g., Claudia H. Deutsch, Carl Fiorina? He'd Probably Be Out of
Work, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 35 ("If Carleton S. Fiorina were a man, would the
outcome of her turbulent tenure as chief executive of Hewlett-Packard have been
different?"). Some critics claimed she spent too much time courting celebrities rather than
executing the board's strategy. Michael P. Regan, The Big Winners and Losers of 2005: A
Review of the Notable and Notorious Who Made the News, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 29, 2005,
at 66.
99. At least, there were no immediate comparators. Courts are likely to allow
employment discrimination plaintiffs to use predecessors or successors as comparators.
Although, as discussed in Part VI.D., in attempting to use evidence about a successor, a
plaintiff might face statute of limitations issues.
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Dunn's decision-making likely led to retribution by specific board
members. But without some unexpected twists of fate, they would still
look like any other set of ousted CEOs. This is not to say that either
Fiorina or Dunn's situation is a clear case of discrimination. 00 However, a
case may be made given the similar circumstances: the gender of the
chairmen, the board members who played key roles during both tenures,
and the various leaks.
Even if there was no gender discrimination, this episode highlights
some of the major problems that can arise out of the "class of one." If HP
had not replaced Fiorina with another female chairperson (highlighting
possible issues certain members of the board may have had with women
controlling certain aspects of HP), if Dunn had listened to Perkins and did
not reveal the leaker's identity, if Fiorina had agreed to the change in her
job description, commentators would not have taken another look at
Fiorina's HP experience and viewing Dunn's experience in a broader
context of plausible discrimination.'0 ' To prevent these and similar
problems, I propose various changes to the "similarly situated" standard.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES
The "class of one" can be broken into two sub-categories: those who
hold unique positions within a larger organization and those who are the
only employees in a small organization (less than fifteen employees).
Potential remedies relating to the former category will be discussed.' 2
100. In his own 60 Minutes interview in November 2007, Perkins was asked if "part of
the problem was that [he] . . . couldn't accept that there were women in control", Perkins
disagreed and said that "up until Carly, all those few that [he has] ... had to fire have been
men". Tom Perkins Regrets Quitting HP Board, Nov. 4, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/60minutes/main3442193.shtml.
101. "Plausible discrimination" as opposed to the momentary consideration, and then
dismissal, of possible discrimination that occurred right after Fiorina's departure from HP.
See generally supra note 98 (discussing the press response at the time of Fiorina's dismissal
from HP).
102. Title VII covers employees who are part of a firm of fifteen or more employees. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees"). Therefore, those in the latter
category, with fewer than fifteen employees, do not have a federal remedy under Title VII.
See also Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine in
Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1197, 1197 (2006) ("As long as [a
firm] employs no more than fourteen [employees], it can refuse to hire women, Moslems, or
disabled persons, and it will not be in violation of federal discrimination law.").
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A. Broaden the Scope and Standardize the "Similarly Situated" Analysis
For an individual who works at an organization with several
coworkers, but who is not similarly situated to any of them, a uniform and
broad "similarly situated" standard is favorable. A broader standard will
allow more individuals to be considered comparators. For example,
returning to Janet's Marketing Department discussed earlier, a broader
standard would allow for the use of another in the department to be
considered "similarly situated" even though individuals may not have
exactly identical characteristics (e.g., same job title and same
supervisor(s)).0 3 It does not serve society to have varying and fluctuating
standards that govern a federally regulated area such as employment
discrimination under Title VII. Although a broader approach may create
opportunities to manipulate the "similarly situated" standard, 0 4 the level of
injustice avoided arguably counterbalances that potential. This is
especially true given the alternative, a strict standard, which would always
enable employers to find something that could differentiate potential
comparators. 105
Employment discrimination cases are particularly fact-driven and fact-
intensive.10 6 Employment discrimination fact finders pore over mounds of
evidence. Providing a broad "similarly situated" standard that is less
"brightline"'' 0 7 and more case-specific will not add a significant amount of
time to the deliberation process because the facts used to decide the overall
case will include the same facts as those used to determine whether the
103. Therefore, the account managers discussed in note 4 may be considered "similarly
situated" under a broader standard because they share one supervisor and handle similar
tasks. Whereas, under a stricter standard, these differences are likely to be considered
material.
104. For example, this may occur by allowing plaintiffs or defendants to compare
individuals who should not be considered comparable.
105. See Lidge, supra note 5, at 859 ("The Third Circuit in rejecting a similarly situated
requirement pointed out that, [a]ll employees can be characterized as unique in some ways
and as sharing common ground with similarly situated employees in some other ways,
depending on the attributes on which one focuses, and the degree of specificity with which
one considers that employee's qualifications, skills, tasks and level of performance."
(quoting Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 511 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal
quotations omitted)).
106. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination
Disputes as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 55, 68 (2004) ("[E]mployment discrimination cases that reach trial are almost
always fact-intensive .... ); Marla Swartz, The Replacement Dilemma: An Argument for
Eliminating a Non-Class Replacement Requirement in the Prima Facie Stage of Title VII
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claims, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1338, 1349
(2003) ("[E]mployment discrimination suits are by their nature fact intensive.").
107. See generally Part IV (discussing the Tenth Circuit's strict "similarly situated in all
respects" standard and the Eleventh Circuit's "nearly identical" standard).
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plaintiff has a viable comparator. Therefore, those employees who may be
unique in their job title or duties, but may share a supervisor with a
coworker of a higher or lower job status, for example, should be allowed to
broaden the scope of who may be considered "similarly situated."
B. Remove the Comparator Requirement from the Prima Facie Stage
Another needed change is to remove the similarly situated requirement
from the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Six circuits
generally require the use of a comparator at the prima facie stage (Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia), three circuits
reject the requirement (First, Second, and Tenth), while the other three
have confusingly applied both methods (Third, Sixth, and Eighth).
°8
Therefore, six to nine circuits are denying an entire class of plaintiffs a
federal remedy that is rightfully theirs. 0 9
Beyond the removal of a rightful remedy, there are several other
problems with requiring the use of a comparator at the prima facie stage.
Professor Edward F. Lidge 1 ° chronicles several of them.' For example,
Professor Lidge argues that such a "requirement frustrates the purpose of
the prima facie case.2'12 The prima facie case was intended to eliminate
"the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action"
and it was never intended to become "rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."
'113
C. Broaden Discovery Parameters
In general, given the dearth of direct evidence,"
14 some have argued
that federal courts should exercise discretion "to allow a plaintiff [using
indirect evidence] broad workforce and temporal scope in the discovery
process.""' 5 Plaintiffs, and especially "class of one" plaintiffs, should be
108. See Lidge, supra note 5, at 839-49 (providing a brief survey of the circuits that
require "a similarly situated showing as an element of the prima facie case"); see also Sheila
R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 HOUS. L.
REv. 1469, 1511 n.176 (2005) (citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits that require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a similarly situated individual
was treated differently).
109. This assumes that the plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination.
110. Professor Lidge is a Professor of Law at the University of Memphis Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law.
111. Lidge, supra note 5, at 863-64.
112. Id. at 855.
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
114. See Lidge, supra note 5, at 835 ("In most cases alleging individual disparate
treatment, the plaintiff does not possess direct evidence.").
115. Grebeldinger, supra note 14, at 160.
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allowed the same broad discovery as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is allowed when it conducts investigations.
The discovery accorded a private individual in her Circumstantial
Individual Disparate Treatment case should be as broad as the
discovery accorded the EEOC in its litigation; the individual, in
vindicating her rights under an antidiscrimination statute,
essentially serves as a private attorney-general for other
potentially aggrieved individuals. As the Tenth Circuit stated in
the seminal case Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., [522 F.2d 333]
whether the plaintiff is an individual or the EEOC, "[i]t is plain
that the scope of discovery ... is limited only by relevance and
burdensomeness. 116
A broader scope may allow a "class of one" plaintiff to use
comparators who existed prior to and/or following his or her time of
employment with the defendant employer. As in the HP scenario, while
Fiorina did not find someone outside her protected class who was treated
more favorably than her, she did find someone who was within her class
and treated similarly, and knowing about Dunn and Dunn's experience at
HP would be a helpful means for Fiorina to prove a discrimination claim.
Additionally, the existence of subsequent or predecessor CEOs who were
not female, and therefore not within the protected class, but who were
treated more favorably, would also prove helpful.
D. Extend or Toll the Statute of Limitations
As illustrated in the HP scenario, there may be instances where an
individual who suspects discrimination may not be sure that her intuition is
correct because she has no comparators and because it is sometimes
difficult to confirm suspicions of discrimination." 7 However, after learning
of another individual who was in a similar situation and who was treated
similarly/differently, it may provide a potential plaintiff a means to prove
her case. Two possible remedies for such a problem are to either extend or
toll" 18 the statute of limitations for the "class of one."
The HP saga highlights a need to extend the statute of limitations for
filing "class of one" cases. Most discrimination laws, like Title VII,
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
116. Id. at 180 (quoting Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir.
1975)).
117. Discrimination has become more subtle in recent years. See generally supra note
14 (discussing the subtle nature of discrimination).
118. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004) ("[T]olling statute. A law that
interrupts the running of a statute of limitations in certain situations, as when the defendant
cannot be served with process in the forum jurisdiction.").
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must be filed with the EEOC before a private action is pursued."
9 An
individual must file her complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discrimination. 120  This 180 day deadline might be reasonable in
some circumstances, but not so in many "class of one" scenarios.'
2' As
illustrated by the HP events, there are some circumstances that appear more
likely to result from discrimination as an extended period of time 
passes.122
In other instances, there are situations where potential plaintiffs
believe something might be wrong in their work environment but, because
119. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge of Employment
Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-charge-filing.html (last visited Oct.
10, 2007).
There are strict time limits within which charges must be filed:
A charge must be filed with EEOC within 180 days from the date of the
alleged violation, in order to protect the charging party's rights.
This 180-day filing deadline is extended to 300 days if the charge also is
covered by a state or local anti-discrimination law. For ADEA charges,
only state laws extend the filing limit to 300 days.
These time limits do not apply to claims under the Equal Pay Act, because
under that Act persons do not have to first file a charge with EEOC in
order to have the right to go to court. However, since many EPA claims
also raise Title VII sex discrimination issues, it may be advisable to file
charges under both laws within the time limits indicated.
To protect legal rights, it is always best to contact EEOC promptly when
discrimination is suspected.
Id.
120. Id.
121. For example, it was over eighteen months between Fiorina's departure from HP in
February 2005 and Dunn's departure in September 2006 (well over 180 days). Associated
Press, Timeline of the HP Scandal, MSNBC.coM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14801729/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
122. In such an instance, application of the discovery rule of accrual may be desirable.
See Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 86-88 (2005) (stating that an accrual is
one mechanism "for exempting claims from limitations periods").
A court's determination of when a cause of action accrues impacts whether a
plaintiff may successfully bring a claim remote in time. Accrual is the moment
when a plaintiff may bring a cause of action. . . . It is at this point that the
proverbial clock begins to run .... In general, the clock begins to run not on the
date an injury has occurred, but on the date that the plaintiff discovers or should
have reasonably discovered the injury.
Id. at 86. Therefore, if Fiorina wanted to call for the application of this rule, she would have
to argue that her cause of action was triggered by something other than the initial injury.
"The Supreme Court is openly wrestling with the propriety of various accrual approaches-
based largely on the type of claim that is being asserted and the statute being enforced." Id.
at 87 n. 114 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 123-24 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) for the proposition that "[the]
discovery rule applies to discrete acts of employment discrimination.").
CLASS OF ONE
they have no way to confirm it, they would rather not "rock the boat" or
believe what they have experienced is not discrimination at all, but is only
"in their head."' 23  Such feelings might change when potential plaintiffs
leam about incidents involving a comparator who came along later and
who was, for example, treated more favorably because he lacked the trait
discriminated against121 or who was treated similarly (as with the former
HP chairmen). Because a new statute of limitations may be as arbitrary as
the current statute of limitations, it might be preferable to provide a more
flexible tolling of statutes given the "class of one" status.
"Equitable tolling permits a court to suspend the running of a
limitations period for equitable reasons.' 25 Courts have used the doctrine
of equitable tolling when a plaintiff has been unable to discover his
injury. 26 At the same time, the Supreme Court has noted that "[f]ederal
courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly.' ' 27 Despite
this wariness, courts should be more willing to use equitable tolling for the
"class of one" in order to ameliorate the plaintiffs position and to ensure
that they are not at an insurmountable disadvantage if they have no
similarly situated comparators.
VII. CONCLUSION
Those in the "class of one" currently have several obstacles preventing
them from proving discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence.
These obstacles are centered on their very status as the "class of one." As
discussed, there are various changes that could diminish these obstacles.
First, a particularly broad definition of "similarly situated" should be used,
giving the plaintiff greater latitude as to which comparators may be
considered. 28  Second, there should be no requirement to utilize the
123. Cf Bumiller, supra note 82, at 425-26 (discussing that when individuals who
suspected discrimination were asked why they did not complain, they "accounted for their
inaction in terms of the harm their opponent could impose on them .... ).
124. For example, if a 58-year-old employee was replaced by a 25-year-old and the
predecessor learned that his successor was not having similar issues with a "difficult"
supervisor, the 58-year-old might begin to think that the supervisor was "difficult" because
of the former employee's age.
125. Malveaux, supra note 122, at 89.
126. Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37
CREIGHTON L. REv. 493, 505 n.41 (2003) (citing Chakonas v. City of Chicago, 42 F.3d 1132,
1135 (7th Cir. 1994) for the proposition that "[e]quitable tolling is appropriate when the
plaintiff, despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the
existence of his claim").
127. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
128. This greater latitude for the plaintiff would be balanced by a similarly broad reserve
from which the defense could pull comparators. For example, with a broader standard, the
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"similarly situated" standard at the prima facie stage. Third, the "class of
one" should be given broad discovery scope to facilitate a broader
"similarly situated" standard. Finally, given the difficulties unique to the
"class of one," there should be a longer or tolled statute of limitations to
provide for the gathering of additional information, such as learning of
other comparators, to bolster circumstantial evidence.
It is scenarios like that of Carly Fiorina and Patricia Dunn that help
illustrate the need for reform. There are undoubtedly other examples
involving individuals who have less high-powered positions, and
accordingly, those cases likely involve greater injustice given the lack of
attention. If "class of one" litigation continues as it has, the "class of one"
will remain at an insurmountable disadvantage in proving a Title VII
discrimination claim. It is important to establish an equitable system
incorporating the proposals discussed to level the playing field for the
"class of one."
defense can have a wider pool of individuals from which to show that these individuals were
not treated more favorably than the plaintiff.
